Jason got involved in a vehicular collision and was charged with two separate offenses with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, for (1) reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries of one victim (First Criminal Case), and (2) reckless imprudence resulting to homicide of the other victim and damage to property (Second Criminal Case).He pleaded guilty on the First Criminal Case and was penalized with public censure. By this conviction, he asked for the quashal of the Second Criminal Case on the ground of double jeopardy, but was refused by the lower court. He elevated this matter to the Regional Trial Court in a special civil action (SCA Case), and then sought suspension of the Second Criminal Case invoking the SCA Case as a prejudicial question.
The MeTC did not act on the suspension motion but proceeded with the arraignment of the Second Criminal Case, which Jason failed to attend. Because of his non-appearance his bail was cancelled and he was arrested.
At the other side, the respondent victim filed a motion to dismiss the SCA Case on the ground that Jason lost his standing to maintain the suit. Because of this so-called forfeiture of standing due to non-appearance, the RTC dismissed Jason’s SCA Case. After a motion for reconsideration became unsuccessful, Jason filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court on questions of law, particularly on the issue of double jeopardy.
Questions:
1. Did Jason forfeit his standing to seek relief in the SCA Case when the MeTC ordered his arrest after not appearing at the arraignment in the Second Criminal Case?
2. If Jason did forfeit his standing, is his constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the Second Criminal Case?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Jason’s non-appearance at the arraignment in the Second Criminal Case did not divest him of personality to maintain the SCA Case, and that his conviction of the First Criminal Case prohibited the prosecution of the Second Criminal Case by virtue of the double jeopardy principle.
The High Court explained that the defendant's absence only makes his bondsman potentially liable on its bond, and that it could be revoked in the event the bondsman fails to present the accused within 30 days. The accused retained his standing and, in case of non-attendance (without explanation), will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. (Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
According to the Supreme Court, the MeTC is mistaken in finding that the two cases of reckless imprudence are entirely separate offenses using the basis that the Second Criminal Case required proof of an additional fact which the First Criminal Case does not.
The High Court reasoned that reckless imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts.
Among several jurisprudences cited is the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968). A portion from the decision in this case reads as:
"[O]nce convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions."
Source: Jason A. Ivler v. Hon. Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and Evangeline Ponce, G.R. No. 172716
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